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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
CENSORSHIP OF TEXTBOOKS
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate the legal issues pre-
sented to the textbook committees of American public schools when
reading materials intended to be used in public school libraries contain
attacks on religious groups.
This problem was clearly brought into focus when on June 24,
1948, the Board of Education of the city of New York suspended
the magazine, The Nation, from the libraries of public schools by
taking the magazine from the list of approved periodicals. The basis
for the suspension was a series of articles written by Paul Blanchard
which were highly critical of the Roman Catholic Church.' The pur-
pose of the ban was stated to be that the "public school must keep
scrupulously free from entanglements in the strife of sects." '2 The
Superintendent of Schools of the city of New York, William Jansen,
emphasized that The Nation was not banned because it criticized social
and political views of Catholicism, but because it "criticized and 'ridi-
culed by innuendo' Catholic belief, dogmas, and practices."' 3 This de-
cision caused considerable animadversion.4 The legal aspects were
discussed by an unnamed commenter in the Yale Law Journal.5 The
author sees a danger to "Freedom to Learn." The article begins with
the statement:
"The book burning spectre ascribed to the past has experi-
enced a modem revival. Its new setting is in American public
schools where the local school board is playing censor with con-
troversial ideas in books and magazines."6
The author inferentially compares the New York City School
1 The articles in question were the following:
Nov. 1, 1947: "The Roman Catholic Church in Medicine"; Nov. 8, 1947: "The
Sexual Code of the Roman Catholic Church"; Nov. 15, 1947: "The Roman
Catholic Church and the Schools; April 10, 1948: "The Roman Catholic
Church and Fascism"; April 17, 1948: "The Roman Catholic Church and Fasc-
ism"; Nov. 24, 1948: "The Roman Catholic Church and Fascism"; May 1, 1948:
"Roman Catholic Censorship"; May 8, 1948: "Roman Catholic Censorship";
May 15 ,1948: "Roman Catholic Science I, Relics, Saints, Miracles"; May 22,
1948: "Roman Catholic Science II, Apparitions and Evaluation"; May 29,
1948: "The Catholic Church and American Democracy"; June 5, 1948: "The
2 Should Religious Beliefs Be Studied and Criticized in an American Public
School? (A statement by William Jansen, Superintendent of Schools, City of
New York, and Chairman of the Board of Superintendents), Oct. 1, 1948.
The quotation was taken from the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in
State of Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education, 33 U.S. 203, 92 L.
Ed. 49.
3 School and Society, Nov. 26, 1948, p. 351.
4 "Many Groups Fight City Ban on Nation," N.Y. Times, July 14, 1948, p. 25,
col. 1.
5 Comment; School Boards, Schoolbooks and the Freedom to Learn, 59 YALE
L.J., 928, (1950).
6 Ibid., pp. 928-29.
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Board's decision to the burning of twenty thousand "un-German"
books in Berlin Square by Dr. Goebbels.7
The banning of The Nation and the arguments presented by the
Yale commenter will be used as a focal point for this article.
SCHOOL BOARDS AND SCHOOLBOOK SELECTION
Public school education is the function of state governments8 sub-
ject to the parents' more basic right to control the destiny of their
offspring. The state legislatures regulate their educational systems
subject only to the limitations of the Federal Constitution 0 and of
their particular state constitutions?' Much of the detail of school ad-
ministration is left to local school boards. E. Edmund Reutter Jr.,
Associate Professor of Education, Teacher's College, Columbia Univer-
sity, has noted that "the local board of education is the legal body most
closely associated with what is taught to boys and girls.' 2 In about
half of the 48 states local school boards have exclusive power over
textbook selection.1 3 New York is such a state.'4
It is generally held that the courts will not interfere with a school
board's exercise of discretionary powers in areas such as textbook
selection unless there is a clear abuse of this discretion or a violation
of law. They usually will not consider whether the regulations are wise
or expedient but merely whether they arise from a reasonable exercise
of the power and discretion of the board.15 The Arkansas Court in an
early decision stated:
"While (the school directors) authority is not without limit;
yet a wide range of discretion is vested in these boards by the
statute in the matters of government and details of conducting
the common school. Courts will not interfere in matters of de-
tail and government of schools unless the officers refuse to per-
form a clear, plain duty or unless they unreasonably or arbi-
trarily exercise the discretionary power conferred upon them."' 6
The New York Court in Fabricus v. Graves, a more recent case,
announces the same rule:
"The judiciary will not interfere with executive or admini-
strative officers in the performance of their duties which are
discretionary in their nature or involve the exercise of judg-
7 Ibid., footnote 1, p. 928.
8 Reutter, The Law and the Curriculum, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 91 (1955).
9 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925).
10 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bennett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
11 Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S.W. 962, 48 L.R.A. 167 (1899).
12 Supra, note 8, at p. 91.
3 For an evaluation of the advantages of local selection see Seitz, Supervision of
Public, Elementary and Secondary School Pupils Through State Control Over
Curriculum and Textbook Selection, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 116 (1955).
14 N.Y. Educational Law §701.
'5 Am. Jup. Schools, §47, p. 328.
'
6 Maddox v. Neal, 45 Ark. 121, 55 Am. Rep. 540 (1855).
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ment, unless such judgment and discretion bear distinct ear-
marks of either malicious or arbitrary action.' 17
PUBLICATION BANNING AS "ABUSE OF DISCRETION"
The Yale Law Journal commenter argues that it is an unreason-
able use of discretionary power to ban a magazine from the public
schools because of an author's ridicule and criticism of the beliefs of
a particular faith.
"A ban imposed solely because of the author's point of
view is an unconstitutional abuse of the school board's discre-
tion."' 8
No citation is offered to support this view and this writer can find
none. This position is supported by the argument that such a ban
denies the student the "Freedom to Learn", 9 which is protected by
the First Amendment to the Constitution as an adjunct to the Freedom
of Expression.
"Freedom to Learn thus transforms a publisher's well-
recognized rights to speak and print freely into a school-child's
right to serve as an audience. In this manner the benefits of the
First Amendment penetrate to the classroom."'2
This type of reasoning, applied to the facts in the New York
situation, neglects entirely the significance of the First Amendment
and recent United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting that
clause.
THE "ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION" CLAUSE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
An analysis of recent United States Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment as it relates to public education is necessary for a consideration
of the reasonableness of the New York School Board's decision. 2
The Everson"j case held that a statute authorizing reimbursement to
parents of money expended for bus transportation of their children
to and from schools other than those operated for profit, did not,
insofar as it permitted payment for transportation of children attend-
ing Catholic parochial schools, violate the provision of the First
Amendment that no law shall be made "respecting an establishment
of religion." The Court said the purpose of the statute was merely to
17 Fabricus v. Graves, 174 Misc. 130, 22 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229 (1940).
Is Supra, note 4, p. 948.
1o Ibid., p. 945.
20 Ibid., p. 949.
21llinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 92 L.Ed. 644, 68
S.Ct. 461, 2 A.L.R.2d 1338 (1947), Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,
91 L.Ed. 711, 67 S.Ct. 504, 168 A.L.R. 1392 (1946), Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306. 96 L.Ed 954, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1951).
2Ibid.
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provide for safe transportation of school children irrespective of their
religious faith. However, the court did seem to set down a rule that
there was a "wall of separation between the Church and State" which
did not allow for any cooperation between the two:
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: neither a State nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other.... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. '23
The Everson case was expressly cited as authority in Illinois ex
rel McCollum v. Board of Education.24 There a program of released
time for religious instruction in Champaign County, Illinois, was held
to be violative of the doctrine of the separation of church and state as
that doctrine was expressed in the Everson case. The court stressed
that the facts showed that the religious education took place in the
school; the selection of teachers was subject to approval of school
authorities; the schools furnished registration cards; publicity con-
cerning the program was given in the schools; and school authorities
did invoke truancy laws for absences from religious classes.2 This
the Supreme Court held was "beyond all question a utilization of a
tax supported and tax established public school system to aid religious
groups to spread their faith. '26
Zorach v. Clausen 7 also involved a "released time" program. In
that case, however, the program was held not to violate the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court attempted to distinguish the two
cases on their facts:
"This 'released time' program involves neither religious
instruction in public school classrooms nor the expenditure of
public funds. . . . The case is therefore unlike Illinois ex rel
McCollum v. Board of Education which involved a 'released
time' program from Illinois. In that case the classrooms were
turned over to religious instructors. '28
Some commenters have argued that the cases can be distinguished
on their facts.29 Another has stated that the issue has been left in a
"muddle."2 0 The most reasonable position seems to be, however, that
there has been a significant "change of mood" on the part of the
23 Ibid., 330 U.S. 10-15.
24 Supra, note 21.
25 Ibid., 333 U.S. 207-9.
2G Ibid., at page 210.27 Supra, note 21.
28 Ibid. 343 U.S. 308-9.
29 2 DEPAUL L. Rlv. 116, 119 (1952)
3015 GA. B.J. 363, 366 (1953).
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Supreme Court.3' The "wall of separation" as interpreted in the
Everson Case32 does not seem nearly so high nor impregnable in the
light of the reasoning of the court in the Zorach case.
"We are a religious people. . . . When the state encourages
religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by
adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it
follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the
religious nature of our people and accommodates the public
service to their spiritual needs. ' 33
The Supreme Court has probably come much closer to the philosophy
of Pierce v. Society of Sisters" in this case than in its two earlier
decisions. The Zorach decision also seems to be more in harmony
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution.35
However, one basic theme does seem to be present in all three of
these decisions. It would seem clear that direct tax aid to religious
groups to support their functions as religious institutions will never
be sanctioned. The Zorach case pointed out that the "released time"
program there considered was allowed because there was no "expendi-
ture of public funds. '3 6
"The principle of the Zorach case seems to be that, absent
expenditure of tax funds, co-operation of a public school system
with religious education groups will be permitted so long as the
religious right of pupils and parents is respected. '37
Under this interpretation the courts would not allow public funds
to be used to pay for literature prepared by the different faiths to be
used in the libraries of public schools. This would seem to give a
school board a very logical basis for barring any literature which was
intentionally critical of religious dogmas.
True, while the placing of Blanchard's articles in public school
libraries through the expenditure of public funds cannot be con-
sidered direct aid to a particular faith, it is, in a sense, an aid to all
faiths save the Catholic. Essentially, however, it can be banned be-
cause literature prepared by the Catholic Church to present its dogma
cannot be placed in public school libraries and it would be inequitable
to allow an attack upon a religion without allowing an answer. The
public schools would not only be involved in "the strife of sects", 3
they would also be taking sides.
Indeed, one court seems to hold, in the only case which has directly
3"66 HAR. L. REV. 118, 119 (1952).
32Supra, note 23.
33 Supra, note 28 at 313.
3 Supra, note 9.
3527 NOTRE DAME LAW. 529, 539 (1952).
3r.Supra, note 28 at p. 312.
3750 MICH. LAW REV. 1359, 1366 (1952).
38 Supra, note 2.
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considered this question, that the banning of literature highly critical
of a religious faith by a school board would be reasonable. In Rosen-
berg v. Board of Education of the City of New York39 the petitioners
asked for an order reviewing the determination of the Board of Edu-
cation of New York City which allowed the books "Oliver Twist"
and "The Merchant of Venice" to be placed on the approved reading
list. While holding that a work of fiction could never be barred, be-
cause a sensitive person or group was offended by the description
of a particular character belonging to a certain race or religion, the
court did clearly announce that school boards would be acting reason-
ably if they barred a book which had "been maliciously written for
the apparent purpose of promoting and fomenting a bigoted hatred
against a particular racial or religious group." 40 That a reasonable
school board might find that Blanchard's articles had been written
"for the apparent purpose of promoting and fomenting a bigoted
hatred" against the Catholic faith would seem apparent.41
CONCLUSION
Not all books or magazines published can be approved for use in
public schools. Those materials which would involve the public school
in "the strife of sects" would seem to not only come under a con-
stitutional ban but also involve the public schools in conflicts which
could only lessen their efficiency as educational institutions. No rea-
sonable person would argue that religious questions can or should be-
divorced from public education. Fair-minded evaluations of the tenets.
of the different faiths presented without attempts to influence are
necessary in every student's education.42  However, Blanchard's.
articles go far beyond any impartial evaluation of the principles of
Catholicism. J. S. Herron, Superintendent of Schools of Newark,
New Jersey, stated the position of his board of education after The-
Nation was banned from the Newark schools:
"Publications which are patently anti-Catholic, anti-Prote-
stant, anti-Semetic, anti-Negro, or anti-American have no place
as teaching or reference materials in a public school . . .All
people of good will in the community applaud such action even
though some critics will resurrect the term "censorship.","
3 9 Rosenberg v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 196 Misc. 542, 9Z
N.Y.S.2d 344.
40 Ibid., at page 346.
41 "The church, even the American church of the present day, still operates a full
blown system of fetishism and sorcery in which physical objects are supposed
to accomplish physical miracles." Nation, May 15, 1948, p. 522.
"I am convinced that (1) American Catholics are good citizens who (2) are
not responsible for the undemocratic policies of their own priests in the fields
of medicine and education .... ." Nation, Nov. 1, 1947, p. 466.
42 Supra, note 13.
43 N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1948, p. 2, col. 6-7.
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No reasonable person could deny the school board's right to bar
extreme expressions of obscenity or material which is patently sedi-
tious. A fair-minded textbook committee seems to be the best guard
against such literature and also against those who would advocate the
propaganda approach as to materials concerning the various faiths.
This writer is in agreement with the philosophy of Judge Charles S.
Desmond in his analysis of movie censorship:
"Facile writers follow current fashion, but detour around
logic and history when they deny to censorship any place in
democratic governmental processes and describe all censorships
as repressive and tyrannical interference with freedom to ex-
press ideas." 4
The uses of emotionally weighted phraseology such as "book-burn-
ing"45 does not aid a thoughtful analysis of this or any complex legal
problem. When all of the cogent arguments are composed and weighed,
only one conclusion seems reasonable. The local school boards of our
nation must not be hindered in the efforts to keep the public schools
free of the "strife of sects."
CLAUDE KoRDus
4429 NoTRE DAME LAW. 27, 30 (1953)
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